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 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that in the separation of control and ownership, 
managerial equity ownership for cash flow helps to align the interests of the manager and 
minority shareholders. Managerial equity ownership enhances CEO and executive’s 
incentives, while it also results in the issue of control through entrenchment (Fama, 1980; 
Holmstrom, 1999). In this situation, managers may expropriate minority shareholders and 
extract what the private benefits of control (Grossman and Hart, 1988). According to Murphy 
(1999), the designing of executive compensation contracts to monitor CEOs by the board is 
the central tenet of internal control mechanism to safeguarding shareholder interests. Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) show a positive but weak relationship between CEO compensation and 
firm performance in big listed firms. There is little known whether such relationship holds for 
small and high-technology firms. While venture capital (VC) ownership in corporations has 
grown fast over the last few years, especially in China, their importance in monitoring 
corporate behaviour and executive incentives is still unknown and there is still no evidence 
that VC affected the pay-performance relationship.  
 The agency issue could be severer in VC backed firms because to achieve higher 
returns, VC normally invested in high risky firms with higher growth opportunity and CEOs 
often have great discretion power. Therefore, how to align the interests of managers and the 
rest of shareholders like venture capital investors is far more important for VC-backed firms 
because VCs may have a strong motivation to enhance the pay-performance relationship due 
to the fact that its compensation is also closely linked to a VC-company’s share returns 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1995).   
 Extant literature on the pay-performance relationship focuses mainly on the role of 
corporate governance (Core et al., 1999; Brick et al., 2006) and ownership structure (Kato 
and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006; Barontini and Bozzi, 2010). The effect of VC on the pay-
performance relationship is important because VCs usually have a strong incentive to play 
governance role in the firms they started (e.g. Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1995; Hellmann and 
Puri, 2002; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Hochberg, 2008). In this paper we examine the 
effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship in China’s listed firms and conduct our 
research in China with its specific institutional background for the following reasons.  
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 First, venture capital market in China has grown tremendously in recent decades. 
China becomes the second largest economy in terms of venture capital related activities such 
as VC-backed IPOs,  fund-raising and entrepreneurial financing. Second, with the 
establishment of the Small and Medium board (SMEs board in Shengzhen Stock Exchange) 
in 2004 and the implementation of “The Interim Measures for the Administration of Early-
Stage Venture Capital Enterprises” by the Chinese government in 2005, VC companies have 
emerged and grown very quickly over the past few years. Our sample shows that 59 VC-
backed firms went public in the first half of 2010, which accounts for nearly 40 percent of 
total IPOs in China. Third, unlike developed economies such as the United States and United 
Kingdom, where there is enough protection for investors and private property (Peng, 2001), 
the ambiguous institutional market environment in transition economies makes it difficult for 
VCs to select firms to invest in and effectively monitor those investments  through board of 
directors(Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003; Pruthi, et al., 2003). Therefore, VCs in Chinese firms 
may have an even strong incentive to monitor managerial behaviour by tying executive’s 
compensation to firm performance compared to VCs in developed economies. 
 This paper makes the several contributions. First, while no previous study has 
examined the role of VC in the pay-performance relationship, this paper attempts to fill this 
gap and enlarge the literature on VC and executive incentives. Second, previous studies on 
the pay-performance relationship of Chinese listed firms only focused on executives’ cash 
compensation (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006), this current paper also examines the 
effect of VC on the usage of stock options in compensation package. Yermack (1995) shows 
that stock options are less used in regulated firms but widely used in firms with noisy 
accounting measurements and liquidity constraints. Anderson, Banker and Ravindran 
(2000)’s study of compensation in technology firms suggest that stock and option pay are 
widely used in US. In China, the employment of stock options is only a recent phenomenon. 
It is therefore important to investigate whether the presence of venture capital investors has 
any effect on the likelihood for a firm to adopt stock option as part of CEO compensation 
scheme. Third, agency theory indicates that firms with higher growth opportunity and higher 
capital expenditure may have greater agency costs and managerial discretions, so this study 
especially examines the effect of VC on pay-performance relationship in these firms. Thus 
this paper also contributes to the literature on agency theory. Finally, we focus on the VC and 
pay-performance relationship in China’s specific institutional background so this paper also 
contributes to literature on a transition economy. 
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 Our univariate test results show that VC-backed firms have statistically significantly 
higher performance and CEO compensation than non-VC-backed firms. Our regression 
results further show that VC in China has a significant and positive effect on both CEO 
compensation and the pay-performance relationship. We also find that the interactive term of 
VC*performance*HIGHG (high growth opportunity) is also significantly positively related to 
CEO compensation. The results are similar when we use industry-adjusted performance as 
measures of firm performance. In addition, VC-backed firms with a high growth opportunity 
(high level of capital expenditure) are more likely to use stock options and a higher CEO 
compensation in VC-backed firms can also produce a better performance.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents literature 
reviews and develops several testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes how the variables are 
measured and what methodology was chosen. Section 4 presents our main empirical results 
and interpretation and section 5 summarizes the main conclusions of the research. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1 Literature Review 
2.1.1 The relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation 
 The agency theory developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) was the first to 
highlight the agency conflict between managers and shareholders that results from the 
separation of ownership and control, and also stimulate an interest in executive compensation, 
considered to be the easiest way to measure how managers could take advantage of lack of 
control by owners. Most extant literature then examines executive compensation within the 
agency problem framework. Under this framework, making executive compensation 
dependent on firm performance is seen as an important measure for reducing agency conflict 
and aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. A series of empirical studies in the 
United States have confirmed this positive pay-performance relationship, for example Jensen 
and Murphy (1990), and Gibbons and Murphy (1992). 
 In recent years a second line of research on the pay-performance relationship linked 
pay-performance to corporate governance. For example, Core et al. (1999) examined the 
relationship between corporate governance, CEO compensation, and firm performance in 
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United States firms and found that firms with weak corporate governance usually had greater 
agency problems, worse performance, and better CEO compensation. Brick et al. (2006) 
found that CEO compensation was positively related to director compensation and that excess 
compensation to both CEO and director was directly associated with firm under performance. 
 Another series of studies in recent years investigated whether the pay-performance 
relationship was affected by the ownership structure. For example, Kato and Long (2005) 
found that state ownership in China weakened the pay-performance relationship, while Firth 
(2006) found that direct state ownership and private ownership increased either shareholder 
wealth or profitability, while the pay-performance relationship in firms with state agency as a 
major shareholder was insignificant. Studies on West European firms also found that 
ownership structure had some effect on executive compensation. Elston and Goldberg (2003) 
found that bank ownership in Germany reduced executive compensation and ownership 
structures can affect executive compensation practices. Barontini and Bozzi (2010) indicated 
that the CEO compensation in Italian family firms was higher than non-family firms, and 
ownership concentration had a negative impact on CEO compensation. 
 To sum up, recent studies indicate that under an agency problem framework, CEO 
pay-performance relationship is greatly influenced by a firm’s corporate governance and 
ownership structure, and therefore CEO pay-performance may also be affected by VC 
because VC is a specific type of ownership that plays an important role in corporate 
governance. 
2.1.2 The role of VC in corporate governance  
 Extant literature also indicates that VCs usually have strong incentives to monitor the 
managerial behaviour of the firms they started because their compensation and ability to raise 
further funds depend on their investment returns, which are determined by the share price 
when they sell or distribute their stake in their portfolio firms (Hochberg, 2008). Many 
empirical studies also support this argument, for example Gompers (1995) used a random 
sample from 1961 to 1992 to show that VCs tend to monitor entrepreneurs more frequently 
when the agency costs were expected to be high, while Lerner (1995) used a sample of bio-
technology firms in America between 1978 and 1989 to show that VCs are important 
monitors of managers. Hellmann and Puri (2002) stated that VCs play an important role 
around the time of CEO turnover while empirical research by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) 
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on financial contracts showed that VCs were always allowed to have excess control rights at 
the time of investment and tried very hard to monitor and assist their portfolio companies. 
Hochberg (2008) empirically investigated IPO firms and stated that VC-backed firms have 
less earning management and more independent board structures than non-VC-backed firms. 
 Overall, extant literature shows that a positive relationship between firm performance 
and CEO compensation helps to align the interest of managers and shareholders, although 
this relationship is not always positive due to the weak corporate governance or different 
shareholder incentives. While the literature on VC indicates that as a specific shareholder, 
VCs have strong incentives to monitor the managers of their portfolio firms and ensure that 
optimal governance systems exist. However, no previous literature has investigated the effect 
of VC on the pay-performance relationship. 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
 In this section we have developed our main hypotheses that consider the effect of VC 
on pay-performance relationship in Chinese firms.  
 We first expect that VC will have a positive effect on the pay-performance 
relationship of Chinese firm because VCs should have more incentive to monitor their 
managers. Their monitoring effect in China is even more important because corporate 
governance and protection for investors is still quite weak. For instance, there are no laws and 
regulations for protection of external investors and even the existing laws of administering 
the operation of corporate or securities marketscannot be implemented (Kaoto and Long, 
2005). Under this institutional environment, VCs have to monitor managers more frequently 
to mitigate the expected higher agency costs (Gompers, 1995). Therefore we have 
constructed the following hypothesis: 
H1: VC will have a positive effect on the pay-performance relationship 
 Second, we expect that the positive effect of VC on pay-performance relationship will 
be stronger in firms with opportunities for growth and intensive R&D, because they usually 
had more agency problems and managerial discretions than firms with low growth 
opportunities and less R&D, and were thus more likely to require closer monitoring (Gomper, 
1995). On the other hand, VC-company’s high powered compensation schemes examined by 
Gompers and Lerner (1995) give VC more incentive to closely monitor firms with greater 
agency problems because their individual compensation was linked to the VC-company’s 
share returns. We therefore have the following two hypotheses: 
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H2: the positive effect of VC on pay-performance relationship is stronger in firms with high 
growth opportunities 
H3: the positive effect of VC on pay-performance relationship is stronger in firms with high 
R&D intensities 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data Collection 
 As stated in the sections above, VCs in China began to emerge in 2004 and grew 
rapidly in the capital market after the Small and Medium board (SMEs board) was 
established, and again in 2005 when the government introduced ‘The Interim Measures for 
the Administration of Early-Stage Venture Capital Enterprises’. In this paper we collected 
data from those Chinese firms listed on SMEs board between 2004 and 2009. While only a 
few firms listed on the main board were involved by VCs who just prefer early stage firms 
(Gompers, 1995) becasuethat the majority firms listed on main board are usually large and 
mature. Although there were some additional VC-backed firms who has listed on the Growth 
Enterprises Market (GEM) board since 2009, theses firms are not included because they have 
only one year observation. Therefore, to compare the results of VC-backed and non-VC-
backed firms our data only covers firms listed in China’s SME board, because these firms 
usually have similar characteristics, such as size, growth opportunity, and stage of growth.  
 All the pay, performance data, and other financial and corporate governance 
information used in this study were collected from a series of datasets developed by the 
SinoFin Information Services of the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) at Beijing 
University, i.e. the Chinese Listed Firm Annual Report Database (2004-2009) and the 
Chinese Listed Firm Corporate Governance Database (2004-2009). The stock option data 
were collected from the China Listed Firm’s Corporate Governance Database (2004-2009) of 
China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, and the VC data was 
calculated by hand by compiling information about the firm’s top ten shareholders from the 
Chinese Listed Firm Corporate Governance Database (2004-2009). As indicated by previous 
studies, both the CCER and CSMAR are the most important database on the Chinese capital 
market (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006, 2007).   
 Like previous studies, we excluded firms with the following characteristics: 1) 
Financial firms, 2) “ST” firms, 3) firms whose relevant data were either incomplete or could 
not be acquired.  Finally, our sample consists of 1057 firm-year observations of 357 firms 
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during 2004 to 2009. Previous studies usually used lagged values of performance when 
studying the CEO pay-performance relationship because CEO pays respond to a firm’s 
previous performance (e.g. Merhebi et al., 2006; Firth et al., 2007). In order to follow these 
studies we conducted our regression from the second year after the firm’s IPO-year so our 
final data is from 2005 to 2009, which consists of 700 firm-year observation of 272 firms 
which went public from 2004 to 2008.  
 
3.2 Measuring Variables  
 
3.2.1CEO compensation (PAY) 
 Since 1998 listed firms in China have been reequired to disclose their managerial 
compensation in annual report, including the salary and bonus aggregation of the top three 
executives. We used this information to measure CEO compensation in Chinese firms. We 
used the variable ‘PAY’ which equals the log of the total compensation of the top three 
executives as a proxy for CEO compensation. Stock options are another type of compensation 
for CEO which have been used by some firms for last few years, we also used a dummy 
variable ‘Option’ which equals 1 if a firm’s CEO was granted stock options. 
 
3.2.2 Firm performance 
 Following Hermalin and Wallace (2001), Kato and Kubo (2006), Firth et al. (2006) 
and Cheng (2008), we also use return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) to measure 
accounting based firm performance. We also calculate industry adjusted ROA (ROS), which 
are the difference between a firms actual ROA (ROS) and the median ROA (ROS) in the 
same industry in the same year, and use them to boost to our main results. Finally, we use 
Tobin’s Q, measured as the ratio of market value to firm replacement value as proxy for their 
market performance.   
3.2.3 Measures of VC 
 Variables that measure VC ownership were also used as another type of main 
independent variable in the regression. Following Hochberg (2008), we created a dummy 
variable ‘VC’, which equal 1 if a firm is VC-backed and zero otherwise. We also used the 
‘VC ownership (VCO) variable to capture the total amount of VC shares in a VC-backed firm. 
3.2.4Control variables 
Firm size (SIZE) 
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 Most previous studies found a strong positive relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation (Rosen, 1992; Core et al., 1999; Brunello et al., 2001; Elston and Goldberg, 
2003; Firth et al., 2006). Those studies concluded that CEOs are paid more when a company 
is more successful and when a company is larger. As with previous studies, we used firm size 
(SIZE), a log of its total assets to measure its size. 
 
Board size (BOARDSIZE) 
 Corporate governance theory argues that board of directors generally exists to advise 
and monitor top management, establish executive compensation, and protect the interests of 
shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hallock, 1997; Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Core 
et al., 2001). However, previous studies also indicate that their effectiveness is also 
influenced by its size. For example, Yermack (1996) showed that small boards are more 
effective than large boards because large boards have less influence over CEOs and 
complicates decision making (Jensen, 1993). We also used board size (BOARDSIZE) as a 
control variable.  
 
Board composition (BOARDCOMP) 
 The effectiveness of a board of directors is also influenced by the proportion of 
independent directors; more independent directors can protect the interest of shareholders and 
monitor managerial behaviors much more effectively (Cheng, 2008). Therefore, we used 
board composition (BOARDCOMP) as another control variable to measure the independence 
of a board of directors.  
Leverage (LEV) 
 Leverage is always regarded as an important external power to monitor managers 
(Jensen, 1986; Williamson, 1988). Previous literature also shows that leverage influences 
CEO compensation and firm performance. We also used leverage, which is the book value of 
total debts to total assets as a control variable. 
CEO duality (DUALITY) 
 Previous literature also shows that the ability of a board to monitor management was 
weak when the CEO was the chairman, and the agency cost between managers and 
shareholders increased (Jensen, 1993; Core et al., 1999). Therefore, empirical studies of CEO 
compensation usually indicate a positive relationship between CEO compensation and the 
duality between CEO and chairman (Cyert et al., 2002; Baronyini and Bozzi, 2010). In order 
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to address this duality on CEO compensation, we also used CEO-chairman duality 
(DUALITY) as a control variable.  
CEO age (CEOAGE) 
 Age is also regarded as an important individual characteristic for managers because 
older managers usually have more industrial experience, which is very valuable to a firm. 
Previous literature shows that age also has a significantly positive relationship with CEO 
compensation (Brunello et al., 2001). Thus we define the variable CEO age (CEOAGE) as a 
measure of CEO experience. 
Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) 
 Previous study on the CEO pay-performance relationship in China also shows that 
firms with foreign investors have stronger pay–performance sensitivities, which indicates that 
foreign investors have more incentive to monitor managers and encourage firms to pay 
managers according to their performance (Firth et al., 2006). Therefore, in order to measure 
the effect of foreign ownership, we created a dummy variable foreign ownership (FOREIGN), 
which equals 1 if a firm has one or more foreign shareholders, or 0 otherwise.   
CEO ownership (CEOSHARE) 
 CEO ownership is also regarded as an important determinant of compensation in 
recent literature. For example, Core et al. (1999) indicated that CEO compensation decreased 
when CEO ownership increased. Therefore, we also included CEO ownership (CEOSHARE) 
in our regression. 
Type of controlling shareholder (STATE) 
 Many previous studies showed that the CEO pay-performance relationship was 
affected by the type of controlling shareholder (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006; 
Barontini and Bozzi, 2010). In China there are two important types, state ownership and 
private ownership, so we defined a dummy variable (STATE) to measure the type of 
controlling shareholder where the variable equals 1 if a firm is ultimately controlled by the 
Central or local governments, or 0 otherwise.  
High growth (HIGHG) 
 As discussed in previous sections, we expected that any positive effect of VC on pay-
performance relationship may also be affected by a firm’s growth opportunities. Therefore, 
we defined the variable ‘High growth (HIGHG)’ to measure the characteristic growth 
opportunities. The variable HIGHG was defined as a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
sales growth was higher than the sample median.  
12 
 
High capital expenditure (HIGHCAPEX) 
 We also expected that a positive effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship 
would be stronger in firms with intensive R&D. Since the information on firm’s R&D 
expenditure was not fully disclosed, we used capital expenditure as a proxy for R&D instead. 
We defined the variable HIGHCAPEX as a dummy variable equal to 1 if capital expenditure 
to sales was higher than the sample median.  
Other control variables  
 As with other papers, we also included year dummy and industry dummy in our 
equation to control the effect of time and industries. Since there are only several limited 
number of firms exist in some industries based on Chinese reported industry classification,  
following Firth et al. (2006) we classified our sample into five groups, industrial, commercial, 
public utility, property, and conglomerate (all other industries). A detailed definition of all 
variables used in this paper can be seen in Table 1. 
 
<Table 1 here> 
3.3 Estimation Models 
 The main models used for estimation in this paper are as follows: 
it 0 1 it-1 2 it it-1 3 it
4 it 5 it 6 it 7 it 8 it
9 it 10 it 11 it
PAY =α +α PERFORMANCE + VC *PERFORMANCE +α SIZE
+ BOARDSIZE +α BOARDCOMP +α LEV +α DUALITY +α AGE




                     (1) 
We used Equation (1) to test the direct effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship. In 
Equation (1), i and t represents the firm and year, and ε  is the error term related to 
unobservable features that explain cross sectional variations in CEO pay. PAY is the level of 
managerial compensation measured by a log of the total top three levels of executive 
compensation. PERFORMANCE is firm performance, as discussed above, where we proxied 
firm performance using return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), and Tobin’s Q (Q), 
and then regressed them in separate equations. SIZE is the log of the total firm assets, 
BOARDSIZE is the log of the total number of directors, BOARDCOMP is the proportion of 
independent directors, LEV is the ratio of total debts to total assets, DUALITY is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if a CEO is also chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise, AGE is the 
average age of the executives, FOREIGN a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has one or 
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more foreign shareholders, STATE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is ultimately 
controlled by state or local governments, CEOSHARE is the proportion of shares held by a 
CEO. We also included dummy variables to control for industry and year effects. Our 
baseline equation is Equation (1) without the interactive term of VC and performance.  
 The aim of Equation (2) was to test the effect of VC on the pay-performance 
relationship in firms with higher agency costs (higher growth opportunities and higher levels 
of capital expenditure). In Equation (2), HIGHG (HIGHCAPEX) is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the sales growth (capital expenditure to sales) was higher than the median and 0 
otherwise, other variables have the same meaning as equation (1).
  
it 0 1 it-1 2 it it-1
3 it 4 it 5 it 6 it 7 it 8 it 9 it
10 it 11 it
PAY =α +α PERFORMANCE +α VC *HIGHG(HIGHCAPEX) *PERFORMANCE
+α SIZE + BOARDSIZE +α BOARDCOMP +α LEV +α DUALITY +α AGE +α FROEIGN




   (2) 
 Equation (3) is a logistic estimation model where the dependent variable OPTION is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if a CEO is granted stock options or 0 otherwise. The aim of 
Equation (3) was to test the effect of VC on stock options. In Equation (3), GROWTH is the 
percentage of sales growth, CAPEX is the total capital expenditure to total sales, while Q is 
the market value to book value of total assets. Other variables have the same meaning as 
equation (1). 
it 0 1 it-1 2 it it-1 3 it
4 it 5 it 6 it 7 it 8 it
9 it 10 it 11 it
OPTION =α +α VC +α VC *GROWTH /CAPEX /Q +α SIZE +
BOARDSIZE +α BOARDCOMP +α LEV +α DUALITY +α AGE




      (3) 
3.4 Sample Statistics 
 Table 2 presents the summary statistics for our sample. In table 2, panel A is the 
results of the descriptive statistics while panels B, C, and D present the uni-variate tests for 
VC and non-VC backed firms, VC and non-VC backed firms based on years, VC and non-
VC backed firms based on industry. The results in panel A show that the average CEO 
compensation of the top three executives was 946,900RMB, while VC backed observations 
account for about 25.29 percent of the total sample.  In addition, the average ROA, ROS, and 
Q for the sample firms are 6.05 percent, 9.65 percent, and 1.61 percent, respectively. In the 
same period the ROA, ROS, and Q for all of China’s listed firms were 2.26 percent, -0.043 
percent, and 1.16 percent (Cao et al., 2010). Obviously, firms listed in SMEs board have 
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higher profitability and market value (growth opportunity) than firms listed in on the main 
board. 
 From Panel B we can see that VC-backed firms have a significantly higher CEO 
compensation, return on assets, return on sales, and Tobin’s Q, than non-VC-backed firms. 
This result suggests that CEO compensation in VC-backed firms is positively associated with 
performance. In addition, VC-backed firms appear to have larger boards than non-VC-backed 
firms, perhaps because investor protection in China is still weak, so VCs usually have an 
incentive to have a voice in the board of directors. Finally, VC-backed firms are more likely 
to have foreign investors.  
 The yearly univariate test results in panel C show no significant difference between 
CEO compensation of VC-backed and non-VC backed firms in the first three years, but CEO 
compensation of VC-backed firms were significantly higher than non-VC-backed firms over 
the last two years. The results indicate that although CEO compensation of both VC-backed 
firms and non-VC-backed firms increased from 2005 to 2009, CEO compensation in VC-
backed firms grew faster than in non-VC-backed firms. As a result, CEO compensation in 
VC-backed firms was significantly higher than non-VC backed firms in recent years. 
 Panel D shows that CEO compensation varies across industries. For example, for VC-
backed firms, CEOs in the property industry had the highest levels of compensation 
(1,809,257 RMB), and those in public utilities had the lowest (584,666 RMB). The results 
also showed that VC-backed firms in manufacture and property had significantly higher 
levels of compensation than non-VC-backed firms. 
<Table 2 here> 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 The effect of VC and performance on CEO compensation 
 We first conducted our baseline regression to see how VC, performance, and other 
control variables affected CEO compensation. The results are reported below in Table 3. As 
shown in Table 3, VC had a statistically significantly positive relationship with CEO 
compensation which was consistent with our uni-variate test results. This indicates that CEO 
compensation in VC-backed firms was higher than non-VC-backed firms. In addition, both 
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the lagged ROA and Q are positively and statistically significantly associated with CEO 
compensation, which indicates that top executives are paid more in firms with a better 
accounting performance (higher ROA) or market performance (higher Q). A lagged ROS had 
no statistically significant relationship with CEO compensation which indicated that ROS are 
less important in determining CEO compensation.  
 Turning to the other explanatory variables, we found that most control variables have 
a statistically significant relationship with CEO compensation. We showed that firm size has 
a positive and significant relationship with CEO compensation which indicates that larger 
firms paid their CEOs more than smaller ones. This result is also consistent with most 
previous studies (Rosen, 1992; Brunello et al., 2001; Girma et al., 2007). Leverage is 
statistically negatively associated with CEO compensation which indicates that firms with 
higher leverage paid their CEOs less, which is consistent with Basu et al.’s (2007), who also 
found that leverage has a statistically negative effect on CEO compensation.   
 We also found that CEO duality had a positively and significantly positive 
relationship with CEO compensation which was consistent with (Core et al., 1999; Cyert et 
al., 2002; Baronyini and Bozzi, 2010). The result indicates that CEO compensation is high 
when a CEO is also the chairman of the board. Consistent with Brunello et al. (2001), our 
result shows that age was significantly positively related to CEO compensation, probably 
because older CEOs have more experience than younger ones.  Unlike Core et al. (1999) who 
found a negative relationship between CEO compensation and CEO ownership we found that 
CEO ownership had a positive effect on their compensation.  
 Other results showed that either the size of a board or its composition had no 
significant effect on CEO compensation, which indicates that board of directors in China 
cannot effectively monitor their managers. We also found that the ownership structure (both 
foreign and state ownership) had no significant relationship with CEO compensation. This 
result differs from most previous studies such as Kato and Long (2005), Firth et al. (2006), 
and Barontini and Bozzi (2010), which may stem from the fact that our sample was only from 
the SMEs board rather than main board in the Chinese capital market. And only a small 
proportion of firms listed in SMEs board have foreign or state ownership. 
<Table 3 here> 
4.2The effect of VC on pay-performance relationship 
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 To examine the effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship we estimated a 
regression using all of Equation (1), which mainly focuses on the interactive terms of VC and 
performance on CEO compensation. The results are reported in Table 4. 
 Table 4 shows that the interactive term of VC and lagged ROA, ROS, and Q are all 
positively and significantly associated with CEO compensation which shows that VC had a 
positive effect on the pay-performance relationship, which was consistent with our hypothesis 
H1. For example, the results in the first column of Table 4 indicate that the pay-performance 
(ROA) sensitivity for VC-backed firms was 4.45 (the sum of 2.67 and 1.77), while the pay-
performance (ROA) sensitivity for non-VC-backed firms was just 1.77. Thus, VC increased 
the pay-performance sensitivity.  
 In addition, the coefficient for Qt-1 was insignificant (p-value is 0.3494), but the 
interactive term of ROA* Qt-1 was significantly positive which shows that Tobin’s Q had no 
significant effect on CEO compensation in non-VC-backed firms but had a significantly 
positive effect on VC-backed firms. Obviously, VCs have more incentive to pay 
compensation according to market performance because VC compensation is closely linked 
to a VC backed company’s share returns (Gompers and Lerner, 1995).  
<Table 4> 
4.3 The effect of VC on pay-performance relationship in firms with high managerial 
discretion 
 Table 5 presents the regression results using Equation (2) to examine the effect of VC 
on pay-performance relationship in firms with higher managerial discretions. As shown in 
Table 4, the interactive term of VC*HIGHG*ROA/ROS/Q were consistently positive and 
significant which shows that VC had a statistically positive effect on the pay-performance 
relationship in high growth firms. This result is consistent with Gompers (1995) who argued 
that the monitoring role of VCs was more important in high growth firms.  
<Table 5 here> 
In addition, the regression results of Equation (3) are reported in Table 6. Similarly, the 
interactive term of VC*HIGHCAPEX* ROA/ROS/Q was also consistently positive and 
significant, which indicates that VC have a statistically positive effect on pay-performance 
relationship of firms with high levels of capital expenditure.  
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These results are consistent with our hypothesis H2 and H3 which means they are also 
supported by our regression results. 
<Table 6 here> 
4.4 Robust test 
 In order to provide some supplementary evidence for our results, we also conducted 
the following regressions as robust tests. We first regressed equation (1) by using industry 
adjusted performance as measures of performance, and then we estimates Equation (4) to see 
the effect of VC on stock options, which are regarded as another type of CEO compensation.  
4.4.1 The effect of VC and industry-adjusted performance on CEO compensation 
 Table 7 presents the results of Equation (1) which show that both VC*ROAAD and 
VC*ROSAD have a statistically significantly positive relationship with CEO compensation. 
This is similar to the results in Table 4. 
<Table 7> 
4.4.2 The effect of VC on stock options 
 As previously discussed, the monitoring role of VC is more important in firms with 
high growth opportunities and high levels of capital expenditure to sales. If this role in these 
firms is important, it is reasonable to expect that VCs in these firms should lead to use more 
stock options as executive incentives, so we used GROWTH and CAPEX in this section 
rather than performance as an independent variable, and the stock options dummy as a 
dependent variable, to conduct a new regression using Equation (4). We also used Tobin’s Q 
as another measure of growth to see the interactive effect of VC and growth (capital 
expenditure) on stock options. The results are reported in Table 8.  
 The results in Table 8 show that the coefficients of the interactive term of 
VC*GROWTH, VC*CAPEX, and VC*Q are consistently positive and the last two 
interactive terms are statistically significant. This indicates that VC-backed firms with high 
capital expenditure and Tobin’s Q are more likely to use stock options. This was also 




4.5The effect of VC ownership on pay-performance relationship 
 We have proved that VCs in China have a positive effect on the pay-performance 
relationship but we still do not know whether VC ownership has a positive effect on this 
relationship in VC-backed firms. To determine this, we designed the following model to see 
the effect of VC ownership on pay-performance within a VC-backed sample. The results are 
reported in Table 9. 
  
it 0 1 it-1 2 it it-1
3 it 4 it 5 it 6 it 7 it 8 it
9 it 10 it it
PAY =α +α PERFORMANCE +α VCO *PERFORMANCE +
α SIZE + BOARDSIZE +α BOARDCOMP +α LEV +α DUALITY +α AGE
+α FROEIGN +α STATE +CEOSHARE +Year and Industries+
α
ε
            Equation (4)                         
The results in Table 9 show that the interactive terms of VC ownership and firm performance 
are positive but they are all insignificant even at 10% level of significance. This indicates that 
VC ownership has a slightly positive effect on pay-performance relationship within VC-
backed firms, which means that the monitoring role of VCs does not decrease significantly 
with a decrease in VC ownership.  
<Table 9> 
4.6 The effect of VC and CEO compensation on performance 
 An effective management compensation and incentive structure means not only 
paying CEOs according to firm performance, but a higher compensation could lead to a better 
performance. We also expect that if the monitor and incentive role of VCs works, a higher 
compensation in the previous year should lead to a better performance next year. We used the 
following equation to examine this hypothesis. In this equation the independent variable is 
firm performance which can be ROA, ROS, and Tobin’s Q, while the major dependent 
variables are VC dummy and CEO compensation. The results are reported in Table 10. 
 
it 0 1 it-1 2 it it-1 3 it 4 it
5 it 6 it 7 it 8 it 9 it
10 it it
PERFORMANCE =α +α PAY +α VC *PAY +α SIZE + BOARDSIZE
+α BOARDCOMP +α LEV +α DUALITY +α AGE +α FROEIGN
+α STATE +CEOSHARE +Year and Industries+
α
ε
         (5)                          
From Table 10 we found that CEO compensation had no significant relationship with ROA 
but there was a statistically significantly negative and positive relationship with ROS and Q. 
This result indicates that high CEO compensation cannot lead to a better performance which 
means that the present compensation and incentive structure in China is still inefficient. 
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However, the results do show that the interactive term VC*PAY had a statistically 
significantly positive effect on the next year’s ROA, ROS, and Q. This result was consistent 
with our expectations which indicated that the structure of management compensation and 
incentives are more efficient in VC-backed firms. 
<Table 10> 
5. Conclusion 
 This paper examined the effect of VC on the pay-performance relationship using 
recent panel data of firms listed in the board of SMEs in China’s capital market. The results 
showed that VCs have an important positive effect on pay-performance sensitivity, especially 
firms with high growth opportunity and high levels of capital expenditure. We also found that 
VC-backed firms with high growth opportunity and high levels of capital expenditure were 
more likely to use stock options, but our results also suggest that any monitoring effect by 
VC was not significantly influenced by VC ownership.  
 Overall, the evidence suggests that venture capital investors use more effective 
compensation contract to incentivise top executives in VC-backed firms and such 
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Table 1. Detailed definition of variables in this paper 
Variables Definition 
Compensation  
Managerial compensation (PAY) Log of the top three executives’ compensation 
CEO stock options (OPTION) Equal to 1 if a CEO has stock options 
VC information   
Venture capital as shareholder (VC) 
Dummy variable, which equals 1 if a firm’s top ten shareholders 
have VCs. 
VC ownership (VCO) The proportion of shares held by VCs. 
Firm performance  
Return on assets (ROA) Net income / total assets  
Return on sales (ROS) Net income/sales 
Tobin’s Q (Q) Market value/replacement value 
Firm and CEO characteristics  
Firm size (SIZE) Log of total assets 
Board size (BOARDSIZE) Total directors on board  
Board composition (BOARDCOMP) Independent directors/total directors  
Leverage (LEV) Total debts/total assets in book value 
CEO-chair duality (DUALITY) Equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
CEO Age (AGE) Average age of managers and board directors 
Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) Equal to 1 if the firm has foreign investors 
CEO ownership (CEOSHARE) Ownership proportion held by CEO 
Firm type (STATE) Equal to 1 if a firm is controlled by the state or local governments 
Growth opportunity (GROWTH) Percentage change of sales 
Capital expenditure (CAPEX) Total capital expenditure to total sales 
High growth dummy (HIGHG) Equal to 1 if the sales growth is larger than the median 
High capital expenditure 
(HIGHCAPEX) 
Equal to 1 if the firm’s capital expenditure/sales is greater than 
the median 
Other variables  
Industry (Industry)  Equal to 1 for the specific industry 





Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics       
  Mean Median Min Max STDEV
Pay (RMB) 946,899 697,250 36,000 11,924,800 872,735 
VC 0.2529 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4350 
ROA 0.0605 0.0579 -0.5656 0.3699 0.0602 
ROS 0.0965 0.0792 -4.6427 1.0000 0.2209 
Q 1.6145 1.3942 0.0927 10.3030 0.9212 
SIZE(Million RMB) 1,589 966 218 35,839 2,379 
BOARDSIZE 5.7471 6.0000 1.0000 11.0000 1.3082 
BOARDCOMP 0.5972 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 0.1431 
LEV 0.4009 0.4069 0.0177 1.2927 0.1835 
DUALITY 0.2000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4003 
AGE 45.59 45.00 36.00 55.00 3.18 
FOREIGN 0.0757 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2647 
CEOOSHARE 0.0411 0.0000 0.0000 0.6911 0.0951 
STATE 0.2543 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4358 
Options (%) 0.1998 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4000
Panel B. Univariate Test for VC and non-VC backed firms 
 VC NONVC Difference T-test
Pay (RMB) 1,226,480 852,280 374,200 5.05***
ROA 0.0718 0.0567 0.0151 2.96***
ROS 0.1316 0.0847 0.0469 2.47***
Q 1.7487 1.5691 0.1796 2.27***
SIZE(Million RMB) 1,384 1,658 -274 -1.32 
BOARDSIZE 5.8701 5.6386 0.2314 1.95**
BOARDCOMP 0.6182 0.6210 -0.0029 -0.11 
LEV 0.3843 0.4066 -0.0223 -1.45 
DUALITY 0.2429 0.1855 0.0575 1.51 
AGE 45.78 45.53 0.25 0.94 
FOREIGN 0.1130 0.0631 0.0499 2.18***
CEOSHARE 0.0491 0.0384 0.0107 1.32 
STATE 0.2542 0.2543 -0.0001 -0.02 
Panel C. Uni-variate test for CEO compensation of VC and Non-VC backed firms based on year 
Year  Obs. VC% VC NONVC Test diff. 
   Mean Median Mean Median T-test U-test 
2005  39  23.08 615,826 659,000 613,225 479,500 0.02 -0.55 
2006  50  22.00 680,945 480,000 646,112 580,000 0.27 -0.04 
2007  119  21.85 940,034 705,334 798,322 630,000 1.03 -1.40 
2008  220  26.36 1,356,104 1,000,000 847,037 651,500 3.38*** -3.72*** 
2009  272  26.84 1,383,004 1,090,200 958,207 683,500 3.37*** -3.66*** 
Panel D. Uni-variate test for CEO compensation of VC and Non-VC backed firms based on industry 
  Obs. VC% VC NONVC Test diff. 
   Mean Median Mean Median T-test U-test 
manufacture 549 25.86 1,220,300 840,000 778,117 618,000  5.29***  -5.39*** 
Commercial 62 24.19 1,369,406 1,319,600 1,181,471 790,000  0.83  -1.73 
public utility 34 26.47 584,666 391,800 879,216 493,700  -0.97  -0.82 
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property 22 31.82 1,809,257 1,950,000 1,269,648 1,316,000  1.66*  -1.66* 
Conglomerate 33 12.12 1,334,125 1,397,400 1,120,498 840,000  0.42  -0.99 
Notes: Definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 1. 
The figures for all the value variables are in China’s currency, RMB. 
The industry classification follows Firth et al. (2006) and classifies firms in our sample into five groups: 
























Table 3. Regression results of pay-performance relationship 
Variable PAY 
    
C 5.5995 4.9359 4.8420 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ROAt-1 2.0691 ***   
 0.0012   
ROSt-1  0.0371  
  0.2158  
Qt-1   0.0481***
   0.0006 
VC 0.3225*** 0.3497 *** 0.3424*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SIZE 0.3558*** 0.4115*** 0.4077***
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BOARDSIZE -0.0089 -0.0151 -0.0094 
 0.5936 0.3736 0.5838 
BOARDCOMP -0.0592 -0.0743 -0.0477 
 0.7320 0.6676 0.7840 
LEV -0.9913*** -1.4395*** -1.3985***
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DUALITY 0.1436*** 0.1270*** 0.1314***
 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 
AGE 0.0211*** 0.0179*** 0.0188***
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FOREIGN -0.0679 -0.0676 -0.0691 
 0.5219 0.5635 0.5441 
STATE 0.0449 0.0370 0.0352 
 0.5016 0.5724 0.5775 
CEOSHARE 0.3800* 0.5349* 0.5456**
 0.0548 0.0562 0.0345 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.2819 0.2637 0.2665 
F-statistic 12.9288 11.8822 12.0428 
Notes: Dependent variable is CEO compensation. Firm performance is measured by three variables: ROA, ROS, 
and Q. VC is the proxy for VC-backed firms. SIZE, BOARDSIZE, BOARDCOMP, LEV, DUALITY, AGE, 
FROEIGN, STATE, and CEOSHARE are defined as in Table 1. The p-values, computed using the White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are displayed in italics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 







Table 4. The effect of VC on pay-performance relationship 
Variable PAY 
    
C 5.7079 5.1799 5.0183 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ROAt-1 1.7721***   
 0.0051   
ROSt-1  0.0340 ***  
  0.0880  
Qt-1   0.0139 
   0.3494 
VC* ROAt-1 2.6790***   
 0.0000   
VC* ROSt-1  1.2080 *** 
  0.0000  
VC* Qt-1   0.1284*** 
   0.0000 
SIZE 0.3486*** 0.3938*** 0.3997 ***
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BOARDSIZE 0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0022 
 0.9179 0.9452 0.8984 
BOARDCOMP -0.0287 -0.0137 0.0014 
 0.8792 0.9433 0.9938 
LEV -0.9415*** -1.3211*** -1.4124*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DUALITY 0.1556*** 0.1488*** 0.1358*** 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
AGE 0.0208*** 0.0177*** 0.0187***
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FOREIGN -0.0424 -0.0270 -0.0423 
 0.6787 0.8182 0.7143 
STATE 0.0279 0.0114 0.0299 
 0.6731 0.8660 0.6316 
CEOSHARE 0.3935* 0.5224* 0.5920** 
 0.0609 0.0773 0.0191 
Year dummy Yes Yes      Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes   Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.2651 0.2374 0.2480 
    F-statistic 11.9651 10.4630 11.0253 
Notes: Dependent variable is CEO compensation. Firm performance is measured by three variables: ROA, ROS, 
and Q. VC is the proxy for VC-backed firms. SIZE, BOARDSIZE, BOARDCOMP, LEV, DUALITY, AGE, 
FROEIGN, STATE, and CEOSHARE are defined as in Table 1. The p-values, computed using the White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are displayed in italics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. The effect of VC, high growth on pay-performance relationship 
Variable PAY 
    
C 5.7768 5.2139 5.0648 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ROAt-1 1.8731 ***   
 0.0056   
ROSt-1  0.0222  
  0.3797  
Qt-1   0.0306** 
   0.0348 
HIGHG 0.0836*** 0.1306*** 0.0924*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
VC*HIGHG* ROAt-1 1.7199***   
 0.0007   
VC*HIGHG* ROSt-1 0.8321***  
  0.0008  
VC*HIGHG* Qt-1   0.1250*** 
   0.0000 
SIZE 0.3368*** 0.3817*** 0.3855*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BOARDSIZE 0.0091 0.0062 0.0071 
 0.6040 0.7402 0.6886 
BOARDCOMP -0.0131 -0.0071 0.0053 
 0.9499 0.9731 0.9785 
LEV -1.0061*** -1.4139*** -1.4232*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DUALITY 0.1584*** 0.1475*** 0.1429*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AGE 0.0231*** 0.0209*** 0.0218*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FOREIGN -0.0204 -0.0129 -0.0215 
 0.8481 0.9143 0.8570 
STATE 0.0287 0.0135 0.0111 
 0.6679 0.8338 0.8625 
CEOSHARE 0.4078* 0.5340* 0.5801** 
 0.0617 0.0781 0.0320 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.2553 0.2363 0.2477 
    F-statistic 10.9713 10.0006 10.5734 
Notes: Dependent variable is CEO compensation. Firm performance is measured by three variables: ROA, ROS, 
and Q. VC is the proxy for VC-backed firms. SIZE, BOARDSIZE, BOARDCOMP, LEV, DUALITY, AGE, 
FROEIGN, STATE, CEOSHARE and HIGHG are defined as in Table 1. The p-values, computed using the 
White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are displayed in italics. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.  The effect of VC, high capital expenditure on pay-performance relationship 
Variable PAY 
    
C 5.7354 5.1512 4.9342 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ROA t-1 2.0879 ***   
 0.0011   
ROS t-1  0.0809***  
  0.0024  
Q t-1   0.0433*** 
   0.0005 
HIGHCAPEX -0.1521*** -0.1399*** -0.1554*** 
 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 
VC*HIGHCAPEX*ROA t-1 3.3706***   
 0.0000   
VC* HIGHCAPEX *ROS t-1  1.7603***  
  0.0000  
VC* HIGHCAPEX *Q t-1   0.1854*** 
   0.0000 
SIZE 0.3459*** 0.3955*** 0.4011*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BOARDSIZE 0.0005 -0.0067 -0.0015 
 0.9804 0.7476 0.9344 
BOARDCOMP -0.0286 -0.0298 0.0163 
 0.8758 0.8679 0.9210 
LEV -0.9772*** -1.3707*** -1.4590*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DUALITY 0.1513*** 0.1391*** 0.1347*** 
 0.0000 0.0004 0.0002 
AGE 0.0224*** 0.0196*** 0.0201*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FOREIGN -0.0325 -0.0238 -0.0282 
 0.7771 0.8483 0.8222 
STATE 0.0571 0.0393 0.0500 
 0.4378 0.6059 0.4639 
CEOSHARE 0.4410** 0.5840* 0.6025** 
 0.0393 0.0558 0.0218 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.2664 0.2430 0.2497 
    F-statistic 11.5771 10.3481 10.6944 
Notes: Dependent variable is CEO compensation. Firm performance is measured by three variables: ROA, ROS, 
and Q. VC is the proxy for VC-backed firms. SIZE, BOARDSIZE, BOARDCOMP, LEV, DUALITY, AGE, 
FROEIGN, STATE, CEOSHARE and HIGHCAPEX are defined as in Table 1. The p-values, computed using 
the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are displayed in italics. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. The effect of VC on pay-performance relationship (Industry-adjusted performance)  
Variable PAY 
    
C 5.4367 4.5339  4.3736 
 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
ROAAD t-1 2.4965***   
 0.0000   
ROSAD t-1  0.1002***   
  0.0010   
QAD t-1   0.0875** 
   0.0123 
VC*ROAAD t-1 0.2972*   
 0.0524   
VC*ROSAD t-1  0.3587*   
  0.0884   
VC*QAD t-1   -0.0601 
   0.4191 
SIZE 0.3458*** 0.4082***  0.4109*** 
 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
BOARDSIZE 0.0144 0.0100  0.0165 
 0.4692 0.6404  0.4281 
BOARDCOMP 0.0352 0.0360  0.0485 
 0.8657 0.8619  0.8161 
LEV -0.8072*** -1.2713***  -1.2797*** 
 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
DUALITY 0.1548*** 0.1393***  0.1414*** 
 0.0000 0.0001  0.0000 
AGE 0.0254*** 0.0222***  0.0233*** 
 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
FOREIGN -0.0059 0.0051  -0.0059 
 0.9486 0.9603  0.9503 
STATE 0.0717 0.0581  0.0689 
 0.2203 0.3453  0.2139 
CEOSHARE 0.4505** 0.6274**  0.6617*** 
 0.0117 0.0197  0.0026 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.2426 0.2158  0.2213 
    F-statistic 12.7819 11.1223  11.4566 
Notes: Dependent variable is CEO compensation. ROAAD, ROSAD, QAD are industry-adjusted firm 
performances. SIZE, BOARDSIZE, BOARDCOMP, LEV, DUALITY, AGE, FROEIGN, STATE, and 
CEOSHARE are defined as in Table 1. The p-values, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity 




Table 8. The effect of VC on stock options 
 OPTION 
    
C -9.5682 -8.5455  -9.2045 
 0.0052 0.0158  0.0073 
GROWTH -0.0077   
 0.9122   
CAPEX  -3.2039***   
  0.0058   
Q   -0.0913 
   0.4842 
VC 0.8936*** 0.5231*  0.3204 
 0.0004 0.0917  0.4474 
VC*GROWTH 0.5510   
 0.3042   
VC*CAPEX  3.5383**   
  0.0187   
VC*Q   0.4041* 
   0.0563 
SIZE 0.6489*** 0.6363***  0.6409*** 
 0.0000 0.0001  0.0001 
BOARDSIZE 0.0216 0.0142  0.0263 
 0.8213 0.8829  0.7856 
BOARDCOMP 0.6333 0.6786  0.7566 
 0.4231 0.3973  0.3435 
LEV -3.3298*** -3.3604***  -3.2592*** 
 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
DUALITY 0.3778 0.3127  0.3682 
 0.1371 0.2199  0.1479 
AGE -0.0990*** -0.1059***  -0.1023*** 
 0.0041 0.0022  0.0031 
FOREIGN -0.1655 -0.1475  -0.1344 
 0.6523 0.6897  0.7155 
STATE -0.5727** -0.5164*  -0.6043** 
 0.0411 0.0658  0.0326 
CEOSHARE -1.1466 -1.0312  -1.0908 
 0.2807 0.3358  0.3053 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Psuedo R2 0.1970 0.2150  0.2030 
Notes: Dependent variable is OPTION dummy. VC is the proxy for VC-backed firms. SIZE, BOARDSIZE, 
BOARDCOMP, LEV, DUALITY, AGE, FROEIGN, STATE, CEOSHARE, GROWTH, CAPEX and Q are 
defined as in Table 1. The p-values, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, 




Table 9. The effect of VC ownership on pay-performance relationship (VC sample)  
Variable PAY 
    
C 2.9063 1.8627  2.6249 
 0.0084 0.0035  0.0059 
ROA t-1 -0.0956   
 0.9373   
ROS t-1  1.3977***   
  0.0000   
Q t-1   0.0932*** 
   0.0001 
VCO*ROA t-1 6.6377   
 0.4608   
VCO*ROS t-1  0.7023   
  0.8840   
VCO*Q t-1   0.1645 
   0.5207 
SIZE 0.5601*** 0.6563***  0.5936*** 
 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
BOARDSIZE 0.0310 0.0211  0.0269 
 0.4115 0.5948  0.4998 
BOARDCOMP 0.5969*** 0.4657***  0.5353*** 
 0.0000 0.0000  0.0003 
LEV -1.6179*** -2.4188***  -1.8307*** 
 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
DUALITY 0.0997*** 0.0424  0.0948 
 0.0877 0.5244  0.1851 
AGE -0.0119 -0.0182*  -0.0151* 
 0.2129 0.0684  0.0905 
FOREIGN -0.1863 -0.1544  -0.1767* 
 0.1391 0.1849  0.0943 
STATE 0.2544*** 0.3199***  0.2772*** 
 0.0018 0.0016  0.0012 
CEOSHARE 0.3438* 0.6834***  0.3190*** 
 0.0743 0.0009  0.0001 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.3500 0.3677  0.3572 
    F-statistic 5.4874 5.8458  5.6306 
Notes: Dependent variable is CEO compensation. ROA, ROS, Q are industry-adjusted firm performances. VCO 
is the proportion of shares held by VCs. SIZE, BOARDSIZE, BOARDCOMP, LEV, DUALITY, AGE, 
FROEIGN, STATE, and CEOSHARE are defined as in Table 1. The p-values, computed using the White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are displayed in italics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. The effect of VC and CEO compensation on performance 
Variable ROA ROS Q
    
C -0.3558 -0.8586  4.4065 
 0.0000 0.1048  0.0003 
PAY t-1 0.0050 -0.0066***  0.1580*** 
 0.2740 0.0057  0.0000 
VC*PAY t-1 0.0009** 0.0032***  0.0149*** 
 0.0302 0.0000  0.0018 
SIZE 0.0260*** 0.0766***  -0.1169 
 0.0000 0.0009  0.1873 
BOARDSIZE -0.0031** -0.0011  -0.1023** 
 0.0186 0.8607  0.0447 
BOARDCOMP -0.0081** -0.0294  -0.3670 
 0.0172 0.1756  0.2233 
LEV -0.2221*** -0.6949***  -1.6006*** 
 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
DUALITY -0.0093* -0.0155  -0.2135** 
 0.0815 0.1823  0.0164 
AGE -0.0017*** -0.0043*  -0.0217*** 
 0.0072 0.0991  0.0000 
FOREIGN 0.0003 -0.0176***  0.1164 
 0.9540 0.0036  0.1240 
STATE -0.0044** -0.0093  0.1081* 
 0.0230 0.7754  0.0749 
CEOSHARE 0.0779*** 0.1638**  -0.0180 
 0.0008 0.0184  0.9616 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.3688 0.2294  0.2710 
    F-statistic 18.7536 10.0464  12.3000 
Notes: Dependent variable is ROA, ROS and Q. PAY is CEO compensation. VC is the proxy for VC-backed 
firms. SIZE, BOARDSIZE, BOARDCOMP, LEV, DUALITY, AGE, FROEIGN, STATE, and CEOSHARE are 
defined as in Table 1. The p-values, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, 
are displayed in italics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
